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MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS-AN APPRECIATION
R. V. FLETCHER *
In the course of the memorial exercises in honor of Justice McReynolds,
held in the Supreme Court of the United States on March 31, 1948, the Attor-
ney General made the significant statement that McReynolds was neither
liberal nor conservative." This observation was made in connection with the
tatement that the Justice, when he was appointed to the Court, was considered
a liberal, and when he left the Court, a conservative. His characterization as
a liberal was by reason of his experience as a prosecutor in anti-trust cases;
his reputation for conservatism rests upon his attitude toward legislative
measures and economic theories that are characteristic of the so-called New
Deal. Stated differently, McReynolds is thought of in certain circles as a
liberal advocate, but an ultra-conservative judge. Both points of view reflect
misconceptions of the man and the basic philosophy by which his life was
ordered.
In striving for an appraisal of his career, it should be remembered that
he was a Scotchman, a Southerner, an admirer of the American 'Constitution,
a fairly strict constructionist, an active practitioner for twenty-five years,
and a man of inflexible purpose and integrity. To him, the law was, indeed, a
jealous mistress. Rarely did he seek to embellish his opinions with classical
or literary references or illustrations. Indeed, Justice McReynolds disclaimed
any purpose to range far afield into the realms of fancy. As he observed in
one of his early cases, "The accurate delimination of the concept 'property'
would afford a theme especially apposite for amplificative philosophic dis-
quisition; but the bankrupt law is a prosy thing intended for ready application
to the everyday affairs of practical business." 2
That the transformation of McReynolds from a public prosecutor to a
Supreme Court Justice did not, ipso facto, change him from a so-called
"liberal" into a so-called "conservative" is evidenced by his record in anti-
trust cases. For example, he concurred in the majority opinion in the Ameri-
can Column. & Lumber Company case,3 in which it was held that the "Open
* Special Counsel (formerly President) Association of American Railroads; Justice,
Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1908-09.
1. The record of these memorial exercises may be found in 68 Sup. Ct. (Adv.
Sheet No. 10) xxvi-xxviii. The statement quoted is on p. xxiv. These exercises con-
sisted of the reading of resolutions adopted by the bar of the Supreme Court on
November 12, 1947, and statements by the Attorney General and the Supreme Court.
Details of Justice McReynolds' biography are set out in these proceedings, including
references to his practice in Tennessee and his position on the faculty of Vanderbilt
Lav School.
2. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U. S. 558, 560, 35 Sup. Ct. 287, 59 L. Ed. 717 (1915).
3. American Column & Lbr. Co. v. U. S., 257 U. S. 377, 42 Sup. Ct. 114,
66 L. Ed. 284 (1921).
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Competition Plan" estabfished by one-third of the lumber manufacturers of
the country violated the law as restricting competition. This concurrence was
despite the dissenting views of those great liberals, Justices Holmes and
Brandeis.
Probably no case can be found that goes further to condemn any form of
price-fixing than the Trenton Potteries case.4 Yet here, although justice
McReynolds' usually sympathetic colleagues, Justices Van Devanter, Suther-
land and Butler, dissented, McReynolds went along with the majority in
holding the pottery people guilty of violating the Sherman Act.
It is true that McReynolds concurred in the dissent of Justice Robert§
in the Sacony-Vacuuumb case 5 but that dissent deals with alleged errors of the
Court in instructing the jury, in certain rulings on the evidence and in per-
mitting improper argument by government counsel. It was the view of the
dissenters that a fair jury trial had been denied appellants.
Justice McReynolds was in accord with the unanimous ruling of the
Court that a combination of ship owners to control prices and services vio-
lated the Sherman Act.
6
It has sometimes been said of Justice McReynolds that he was distinctively
a states rights advocate, concerned with limiting to the utmost the power of
the federal government. But this view is likewise a misconception. The record
of McReynolds on the bench shows that he was just as zealous in repelling
attacks upon federal authority when that authority was sanctioned by the
Constitution as he was in the case of invasions of the reserved power of the
states. Thus, Justice McReynolds was the organ of the Court in striking down
a state statute providing that a foreign corporation, permitted to do business in
Wisconsin, should forfeit that right if it sought to remove a case to the federal
court.7 In his opinion in this case McReynolds cited with approval a pre-
vious decision where it was said: "[T] he judicial power of the.United States as
created by the Constitution and provided for by Congress pursuant to its con-
stitutional authority is a power wholly independent of state action, and which
therefore the several states may not by any exertion of authority in any form,
directly or indirectly, destroy, abridge, limit, or render inefficacious." 8 In this
connection it is interesting to note that McReynolds concurred in Chief Justice
Taft's opinion in the Burke Construction Conpany case 9 holding that a state
4. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392, 47 Sup. Ct. 377, 71
L. Ed. 700 (1927).
5. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 60 Sup. Ct. 811,
84 L. Ed. 1129 (1940).
6. Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U. S. 66, 37 Sup. Ct. 353, 61 L. Ed. 597 (1917).
7. Donald v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal Co., 241 U. S. 329, 36 Sup. Ct.
563, 60 L. Ed. 1027 (1916).
8. Harrison v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R., 232 U. S. 318, 328, 34 Sup. Ct.
333, 58 L. Ed. 318 (1914).




anti-removal statute was invalid regardless of the type of commerce in which
the defendant was engaged, and overruling earlier cases announcing contrary
views.'0
McReynolds was orthodox enough in his views as to the lack of power
in the states to impose any form of direct tax upon instrumentalities of the
federal government. Thus we find no note' of dissent from the opinion of
Justice Sutherland who denied the right of the State of New Ybrk to levy
an income tax upon the salary of the general counsel of the Panama Railroad
Company, owned and operated by the United States." And although the Jus-
tice could hardly agree that sales of gasoline to the United States for use of
the Coast Guard were immune from state taxation,12 yet he had such regard
for the principle of stare decisis that he raised no voice in protest when the
Court, upon the authority of the Panhandle Oil case, recognizing that limita-
tions upon the power of th6 state to tax federal agencies applied precisely to
questions dealing with the power of the federal government to tax state agen-
cies, held that a federal excise tax could not be levied upon a motorcycle sold
to the city of Westfield, Massachusetts.
13
The contract clause of the Constitution, 14 prohibiting action by the states
which would impair the obligations of contracts, has been badly battered in
recent years. To some extent, perhaps, this -tendency to weaken the provision
was accelerated by business conditions in the distressing period of the great
depression, and by New Deal policies and measures, designed, ostensibly at
least, to relieve these conditions. It is doubtful if the contract clause has ever
been so watered down by judicial legislation as it was in the Blaisdell case, 15
presented to the Court in the unhappy year of 1933. That case upheld a state
statute which provided for extending the period of redemption under mortgage
foreclosures beyond the time stated in the mortgage, the provision as to time
of redemption being consistent with the statute in effect when the mortgage
was executed. The syllabus in the Supreme Court Reporter condenses the
brilliant opinion of the Chief Justice, thus:
"Economic conditions may arise in which a temporary restraint of enforcement of
contracts will be consistent with the spirit and purpose of the contract clause, and thus
be within the range of the reserved power of the state to protect the vital interests of
the community."
10. Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535, 24 L. Ed. 148 (1877);
Security Mutual Life Ins. Co. V. Prewitt, 202 U. S. 246, 26 Sup. Ct. 619, 50 L.
Ed. 545 (1906).
11. New York e.x rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U. S. 401, 57 Sup. Ct. 269, 81 L.
Ed. 306 (1937); subsequently overruled, Graves v. New York e.x rel. O'Keefe,.
306 U. S. 466, 59 Sup. Ct. 595, 83 L. Ed. 927 (1939).
12. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 48 Sup. Ct.
451, 72 L. Ed. 857 (1928).
13. Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570, 51 Sup. Ct. 601,
75 L. Ed. 1277 (1931).
14. Art. 1, § 10.
15. Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 298, 54 Sup. Ct. 231,
78 L. Ed. 413 (1934).
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To this holding, which reflects the view, widely held in certain quarters, that
the Constitution must be revised by the Court from time to time to meet altered
and extraordinary conditions not capable of being anticipated by the framers
of the Constitution, the famous four horsemen of the Court, Justices Suther-
land, Van Devanter, McReynolds and Butler, vigorously dissented. Justice
Sutherland was the organ of the minority and his considered dissenting
opinion sounded a solemn warning against a holding which represented
"serious and dangerous inroads upon the limitations of the Constitution
which are almost certain to ensue as a consequence naturally following any
step beyond the boundaries fixed by that instrument." 16 The judgment in the
Blaisdell case rests largely upon the holding in earlier cases dealing with
statutes in New York and the District of Columbia designed to ease the lot
of tenants,'7 who wished to hold possession after the expiration of leases.
Justice McReynolds cannot be charged with any degree of inconsistency since
he joined three of his colleagues in dissenting from the holdings in these
cases, which upheld the right of legislative bodies, despite the contract and
due process clauses of the Constitution, to permit tenants to overstay their
terms.
In truth, McReynolds was a firm believer in the sacredness of contracts.
He held to the view that men shotld carry out their promises whatever might
be the consequences of compliance. He was therefore just as much opposed
to federal impairment of contracts as to state impairment. His inclination
was to construe the Fifth Amendment in such fashion as to protect con-
tractual obligations. Perhaps the attitude of Justice McReynolds upon the
subject of contract impairments can best be appreciated by considering his
dissenting opinion in the Gold Clause Cases.'s The oral utterance of the Jus-
tice when the opinion in the first case was announced by the Chief Justice
has become famous, and familiar to every newspaper reader.19 The studied
later expression, of dissent in all four cases 20 is not so well known, at least
to the laity. In that carefully reasoned dissent, written with due regard to
the statutory situation and the decisions of the English, International and
American Courts, McReynolds expands his views as to the sacredness of
16. 290 U. S. at 448.
17. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L. Ed. 865 (1921) ; Marcus
Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465, 65 L. Ed. 877 (1921).
18. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 294 U. S. 240, 55 Sup. Ct. 407, 79 L.
Ed. 885 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U. S. 317, 55 Sup. Ct. 432, 79 L. Ed.
912 (1935).
19. "It seems impossible to over estimate the result of what has been done here
this day. . . .God knows, I do not want to talk about such matters but it is my
duty. . . .The Constitution is gone . .. this is Nero in his worst form. We are con-
fronted with a dollar which has been reduced to 60c which may be 30c tomorrow,
10c the next day and lc the day following.
"We have tried to prevent its entrance into our legal system but have tried in
-vain. . . ." Time, Feb. 25, 1935, p. 11, col. 3; N. Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1935, p. 15.
20. 294 U. S. 361-81.
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contractual obligations in a fashion that exemplifies his devotion to the prin-
ciple of what he conceives to be honorable conduct both as to private and
government undertakings. To quote some significant expressions in his dis-
senting opinion:
"Just men regard repudiation and spoliation of citizens by their sovereign with
abhorrence; but we are asked to affirm that the Constitution has granted power to
accomplish both. No definite delegation of such a power exists; and we cannot believe
the farseeing framers, who labored with hope of establishing justice and securing the
blessings of liberty, intended that the expected government should have authority to
annihilate its own obligations and destroy the very rights which they were endeavoring
to protect." 21
In discussing the result if the Gold Reserve and similar Acts were given
effect regarding corporate bonds, Justice McReynolds says with feeling and
emphasis:
"We think that in the circumstances Congress had no power to destroy the obliga-
tions of the gold clauses in private obligations. The attempt to do this was plain
usurpation, arbitrary and oppressive." 22
In discussing the effect of the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, the dissent-
ing opinion asserts:
"Again, if effective, the direct, primary and intended result of the Resolution will
be the destruction of valid rights lawfully acquired. There is no question here of the
indirect effect of lawful exercise of power. And citations of opinions which upheld
such indirect effects are beside the mark. The statute does not 'work harm and loss
to individuals indirectly,' it destroys directly. Such interference violates the Fifth
Amendment; there is no provision for compensation. If the destruction is said to be for
the public benefit proper compensation is essential; if for private benefit, the due
process clause bars the way." 23
It was argued in these cases that the effect of striking down these relief
measures would be to work intolerable hardships upon debtors, and lead to
widespread bankruptcies. But McReynolds does not flinch in the face of these
well grounded predictions of disaster. Instead he observes:
"Counsel for the Government and railway companies asserted with emphasis tlat
incalculable financial disaster would follow refusal to uphold, as authorized by the
Constitution, impairment and repudiation of private obligations and public debts. Their
forecast is discredited by manifest exaggeration. But whatever may be the situation
now confronting us, it is the outcome of attempts to destroy lawful undertakings by
legislative action; and this we think the Court should disapprove in no uncertain
terms." 24
* The dissenting opinion concludes with this solemn warning:
21. Id. at 362.
22. Id. at 375.
23. Id. at 376.
24. Id. at 381.
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"Loss of reputation for honorable dealing will bring us unending humiliation;
the impending legal and moral chaos is appalling." 2 5
Here we see McReynolds at his best or worst, according to our views as to
the rights of the individual under our form of government as opposed to the
welfare of the majority, as that welfare is determined by the action of Con-
gress, legislating in a period of unprecedented difficulty. Not wholly unaware
of existing crises, Justice McReynolds could not bring himself to seek a
remedy by ingenious and novel departures from established standards of con-
stitutional interpretation; his suggestion was that if the Constitution was out-
worn and inadequate to meet present conditions, it should be amended and not
disregarded. To quote his language in another vigorous dissent:
"Until now I had supposed that a man's liberty and property-with their essen-
tial incidents-were under the protection of our charter, and not subordinate to whims
or caprices or fanciful ideas of those who happen for the day to constitute the legis-
lative majority. The contrary doctrine is revolutionary and leads straight toward
destruction of our well-tried and successful system of government. Perhaps another
system may be better,-I do not happen to think so,-but it is the duty of the courts to
uphold the old one unless and until superseded through orderly methods." 26
That McReynolds had a wholesome respect for the doctrine of stare decisis
no one can deny. Indeed, an examination of his opinions, concurrences and
dissents in more than 500 cases in which he expressed his views during the
26 Years of his service on the Court, discloses very few instances where he
advocated the disregard of previous decisions. And yet when no rights of
property were involved and when Constitutional questions were present, he
did not hesitate to express his disapproval of earlier cases. As an example,
early in his career on the bench, in a case involving a suit against state
officers, 27 he boldly advocated overruling such familiar cases as Ex parte
Yoking,28 saying that cases supporting the doctrine that Federal Courts pIay
enjoin the enforcement of state enacted criminal statutes should be over-
ruled as plainly in violation of the Eleventh Amendment. McReynolds was
no slave to precedent when, in his judgment, a previous holding of the Court
contravened the plain language of the Constitution.
Any review of the judicial career of Justice McReynolds should deal
with his struggle to retain the conventional theory as to construction of
statutes, and his utter rejection of any justification for judicial legislation,
which was one of his pet abhorrences. He concurred in the vigorous dissent of
Mr. Justice Sutherland in a case in which the Justice emphatically asserted
25. Ibid.
26. Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 450-51, 39 Sup. Ct. 553,
63 L. Ed. 1058 (1919).
27. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7, 60 L. Ed. 131 (1915).
28. 209 U. S. 123, 28 Sup. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908).
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"The judicial function, as many times we have been told, does not include
the power to amend a statute." 29
That case, decided in 1938, while by no means of great public importance,
illustrates very well the conflict of view between strict constructionists on the
Court, and the rapidly increasing majority who indicated by the course of
decision, if not by positive declaration, that the statutes may very well be
construed to reflect what was the probable legislative will even though not
expressly stated in the language employed. As an extreme instance of such a
viewpoint, reference may be made to a decision rendered two days after
Justice McReynolds had retired, in which the majority, all New Deal ap-
pointees, announced the view that since Congress had prohibited proceedings
by injunction in labor cases on the ground that equity proceedings would
ordinarily deny a jury trial, there could be no criminal proceeding under the
Sherman Act, although trial by jury in such action would be preserved.30
Justice Stone, a pre-Roosevelt judge, concurred in the result on the view
that the indictment was defective. It would be difficult to find a decision that
departs more radically from the conventional rules that govern statutory con-
struction. Think of this:
"To be sure, Congress expressed this national policy and determined the bounds of
a labor dispute in an act explicitly dealing with the further withdrawal of injunctions in
labor controversies. But to argue, as it was urged before us, that the Duplex Printing
Press Co. case still governs for purposes -of a criminal prosecution is to say that that
which on the equity side of the court is allowable conduct may in a criminal pro-
ceeding become the road to prison. It would be strange indeed that although neither
the Government nor Anheuser-Busch could have sought an injunction against the acts
here challenged, the elaborate efforts to permit such conduct failed to prevent criminal
liability punishable with imprisonment and heavy fines. That is not the way to read the
will of Congress . . ." 31
In other words, the holding is that since Congress has seen proper to insure
a jury trial for violations of the Sherman Act, in labor cases, there can be no
jury trial nor any other form of trial in such cases. From this remarkable
conclusion even the quasi-liberal constructionists Chief Justice Hughes and
Justice Roberts dissented. In that dissenting opinion (by Justice Roberts)
it is said:
"By a process of construction never, as I think, heretofore indulged by this
court, it is now found that, because Congress forbade the issuing of injunctions to
restrain certain conduct, it intended to repeal the provisions of the Sherman Act
authorizing actions at law and criminal prosecutions for the commission of torts
and crimes defined by the anti-trust laws. The doctrine now announced seems to be
that an indication of a change of policy in an Act as respects one specific item in
29. United States v. Raynor, 302 U. S. 540, 552, 58 Sup. Ct. 353, 82 L. Ed. 413
(1938).
30. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 61 Sup. Ct. 463, 85 L. Ed.
788 (1941).
31. 312 U. S. at 234-35.
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a general field of the law, covered by an earlier Act, justifies this court in spelling
out an implied repeal of the whole of the earlier statute as applied to conduct
of the sort here involved. I venture to say that no court has ever undertaken so
radically to legislate where Congress has refused to do so."32
It is almost a certainty that had not Justice McReynolds laid aside his armor
two days before this case was decided he would have waved the banner of
revolt even more vigorously than his cooler colleague from Pennsylvania.
One curious feature of this decision deserves passing notice. Justice
Frankfurter cites as an authority in support of his precedent-shattering opin-
ion an earlier case in which the conclusion was only a grain less surprising.33
In this Keifer case, Justice Frankfurter, the organ of a unanimous Court,
held that although Congress in authorizing the organization of regional agri-
cultural credit corporations had not provided that these government agencies
could be sued, yet they could be sued because Congress in creating numerous
other government owned and operated corporations had provided that these
others could be sued. And further, that the regional organizations being
creatures of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation could be sued because
Congress had provided that the parent corporation could be sued. This is a
feature of heredity which has not heretofore been recognized in the law.
Strange to say Justice McReynolds is not found in dissent in the Keifer case.
This may be an example of Jupiter nodding or it may be that even the iron
will of McReynolds had been weakened by fatigue and a sense of futility in
the face of repeated defeats. Those interested in the swing of the Court from
orthodoxy to modern judicial thinking will be interested in re-reading what
Justice Frankfurter says in his concurring opinion in a case which held that
the State of New York can levy an income tax upon the salary of an em-
ployee of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, a federal agency created by
Congress to provide emergency relief to home owners.3 4 That case overrules.
expressly a number of earlier cases granting immunity from income taxes
levied by either state or federal government upon the compensation of the
employees of the other. Speaking of the earlier practice of the judges to ren-
der individual opinions, now largely abandoned, Justice Frankfurter' says:
"But the old tradition still has relevance when an important shift in con-
stitutional doctrine is announced after a reconstruction in the membership of the
Court. Such shifts of opinion should not derive from mere private judgment.
They must be duly mindful of the necessary demands of continuity in civilized
society. A reversal of a long current of decisions can be justified only if rooted
in the Constitution itself as an historic document designed for a developing
nation." 35
32. Id. at 245.
33. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S. 381, 59 Sup. Ct.
516, 83 L. Ed. 784 (1939).
34. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 59 Sup. Ct. 595, 83 L.
Ed. 927 (1939).
35. 306 U. S. at 487-88. (Italics added).
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It is abundantly evident that McReynolds did not sympathize with this shift
in constitutional doctrine brought about by the reconstructed Court. For in
this very case, he joined with Justice Butler in a brief but vigorous dissent.
It has been sometimes asserted that Justices McReynolds and Brandeis,
in the pre-New Deal era, represented opposing points of view as to the value
to be attached to precedent and, indeed, upon the broader question of con-
stitutional interpretation. And it has also been said that this conflict of opinion
affected the personal relations of these eminent jurists. As to the latter asser-
tion, the writer has no knowledge. Certain it is that the apprehensions enter-
tained by many sincere members of the bar at the time of his appointment as
to Justice Brandeis's fitness for judicial duties disappeared in the face of his
brilliant career on the bench, characterized by fairness, graciousness, prodigious
industry, sound learning and almost unprecedented ability as a writer of
opinions. The distinction between the approach of McReynolds and Brandeis
to problems of a public character is very well illustrated by their respective
opinions in a familiar case dealing with the valuation of property dedicated
to public service.
36
An examination of the opinion of the Court written by McReynolds
discloses not only the disposition of the Justice to adhere to settled principles,
but also throws light upon his method of stating and disposing of cases. Al-
most invariably, McReynolds states the case in the body of the opinion, rather
than separately. The facts are stated with commendable brevity and in such
fashion as to present only the salient points. There are extended quotations
from the decision under review, it being, obviously, the McReynolds con-
caption that the theory of the lower tribunal can best be understood by using
its exact language. Then follow references to standard authorities with brief
and pertinent quotations therefrom.
The 'Court's conclusion that reproduction cost at current prices must be
given effect is stated briefly, one might be tempted to say, dogmatically. But
no one can be doubtful as to what was actually decided. If we turn then to
the Brandeis dissent upholding the doctrine of prudent investment with its
wealth of references to economic studies and its exquisite process of plausible
exposition, we get a very good idea of the mental processes of these powerful
exponents of opposing ideologies.
The majority view, as expressed by Justice McReynolds, was upheld for
many years, as a glance at the record will show. Thus in 1926, in a water case
from Indiana,37 the Court, through Justice Butler, reaffirmed the holding that
in determining value consideration must be given to current prices and wages.
Justice Holmes concurred in the result, probably upon the view that the right
36. Southwestern Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U. S. 276,
43 Sup. Ct. 544, 67 L. Ed. 981 (1923).




decision had been rendered even if the theory of the Court was erroneous.
Since the decision in the Southwestern Telephone case, -3 Justice McKenna
had ceased to be a member of the Court, and Justice Stone was on the bench.
He joined Brandeis in dissenting.
In a railroad-recapture case, decided in 1928, 39 Justice McReynolds again
spoke for the Court in upholding the reproduction theory of valuing property
devoted to public use. Characteristic of Judge McReynolds' philosophy and
style is the following:
"In the exercise of its proper function this Court has declared the law of the
land concerning valuations for rate-making purposes. The Commission disregarded
the approved rule and has thereby failed to discharge the definite duty imposed
by Congress. Unfortunately, proper heed was denied the timely admonition of the
minority: 'The function of this commission is not to act as an arbiter in economics,
but as an agency of Congress, to apply the law of the land to facts developed
of record in matters committed by Congress to our jurisdiction.' "40
The quioted observation from the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Hall,
may well be adopted as justice McReynolds' conception of the duty of the
courts. The elaborate and very persuasive dissenting opinion of Justice
Brandeis was this time concurred in by both Holmes and Stone.
For many years, the stout position of McReynolds in these cases was
recognized as the law. But, of course, with the shift from the old to the new
Court, with its corresponding change in point of view, the theory of constitu-
tional protection of values and earnings has gone with the wind.4' Admirers
of Justice McReynolds take comfort in the fact that when these devastating
decisions were rendered, the venerable Justice was spared the agony of being
present at the slaughter of his cherished lifetime beliefs.
No estimate of Justice McReynolds' work on the Court can afford to
ignore his diligent labor over a quarter of a century in the disposition of
ordinary cases to which the public pays little or no attention. Probably ninety
per cent of all the cases that reach the Supreme Court have little or no politi-
cal complexion. And yet they present multitudes of difficult questions of law,
of the greatest importance to litigants and their counsel. They concern prop-
erty rights of every variety-priorities in bankruptcy, nice questions of
admiralty law, validity of patents and copyrights, issues in Federal Employers
38. Supra, note 36.
39. St. Louis & O'Fallon R. R. v. United States, 279 U. S. 461, 49 Sup. Ct. 384,
73 L. Ed. 798 (1929).
40. 279 U. S. at 487. 0
41. Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipelines Co., 315 U. S. 575, 62 Sup.
Ct. 736, 86 L. Ed. 1037 (1942); Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas,
Company, 320 U. S. 591, 64 Sup. Ct. 281, 88 L. Ed. 333 (1944); Colorado Interstate
Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 324 U. S. 581, 65 Sup. Ct. 829, 89 L. Ed.
1206 (1945); Colorado-Wyoming Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 324 U. S.
626, 65 Sup. Ct. 850, 89 L. Ed. 1235 (1945); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Lines Co. v.
Federal Power Commission, 324 U. S. 635, 65 Sup. Ct. 821, 89 L. Ed. 1241 (1945).
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,Liability cases, matters of federal jurisdiction and the venue of cases, appli-
cation of the principles governing conflict of laws, questions that deal with
pleadings, alleged errors in the admission or exclusion of testimony-all the
interminable and often tedious questions that arise in the trial of cases from
the filing of a complaint in the court of first instance until judgment is ren-
dered in the court of last resort.
In this class of cases, Justice McReynolds bore his full share of labor
and responsibility. And it is significant that his judgments were very rarely
the subject of dissents by his brethren-a mark of confidence in his diligence,
his devotion to duty and his sound conception of the law. In a very real sense,
he was a lawyer's judge; the bar came to have the highest respect for'his
intellectual integrity, his insistence upon orderly procedure, and his studied
avoidance of obiter, even when there may have been an alluring temptation
to catch the public eye by some spectacular utterance.
McReynolds was a rigid, inflexible precisian. He detested and penalized
slovenliness, whether it was manifest in the record or evident in the manner
or even the attire of the advocate at the bar. It is reported of him that he once
privately chided a friend for appearing before the 'Court without a waistcoat,
and at another time he gently criticized in conversation a very eminent lawyer
because in the course of an argument he thrust his hand into the pocket of his
trousers. He was keen in his scrutiny of petitions for certiorari, and woe
betide the attorney who at the bar sought to depart from the points urged in
the petition. He had little patience with a lawyer who undertook to argue his
case with defective knowledge of the record. His distaste for prolixity either in
argument or in opinions was often manifest. His frequent questions from the
bench went straight to the heart of the issues in controversy. He had a prac-
tice, sometimes very disturbing to counsel, of asking the 6ne who opened the
argument to state his opponent's contention in addition to his own. He did
not cultivate the faculty, prominent in Chief Justice Taft and in Justice Bran-
deis, of putting the lawyer at his ease. Indeed, upon occasion, particularly when
the ground was a trifle treacherous, his attitude made advocacy difficult.
The writer of this paper is not competent from personal experience to
discuss the personal side of Justice McReynolds. Others, however, who knew
him well have recently testified to his charitable proclivities, his tender interest
in little children, and the spotless purity of his private life. Altogether he was
an impressive figure who can never be ignored in any objective study of his
times-an example of unfailing devotion to what he believed to be the best
interests of his country-one who never "bent the pregnant hinges of the
knees that thrift may follow fawning."
In Mr. James A. Farley's latest book dealing with the Roosevelt years,
he mentions an interview with President Roosevelt in which the Chief Execu-
tive speaks of the retirement from the Supreme Court of Mr. Justice Van
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Devanter. The President read to Mr. Farley a note addressed by Mr. Roose-
velt to the retiring Justice, cordial in tone, in which Justice Van Devanter
was urged to pay the President a visit. But the President added, so Mr. Farley
reports, that there was one Justice on the Court that would receive no such
invitation when he finally retired. When Farley suggested that perhaps the
reference was to Justice McReynolds, President Roosevelt smilingly acqui-
esced.42 Doubtless this remark made to an intimate friend was on the jocose
order. But if there was a trace of seriousness in the remark, it but pays
tribute to the strength and influence of a powerful personality, utterly out of
sympathy with the econQmic and political theories then being eloquently
advocated and widely accepted.
42. FARLEY. JIM FARLEY'S STORY: THE RoosEVELT YEARS, 83 (1948).
